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This essay argues that understanding both the process by which medievalism tropes 
feature in the formation of moral panics and the manner in which medievalists are 
drawn into the debate reveals much about the imagination of the medieval in the 
shaping of the modern, and also some salient points relating to role of scholars in 
public discourse. It would be glib and unhelpful to promote the message that 
medievalists are making moral-panic medievalisms worse, nor would it be true. The 
power to analyze and critique the circumstances by which medievalisms become 
intertwined with the symbolism of moral-panic phenomena is valuable indeed. Nor is 
any scholarly call for historical accuracy ever in vain. 
Academic contributions to the debate serve to encourage greater recognition of 
the essential normality and humanity of many seemingly alien behaviors. Just as there 
is a struggle to recognize the inherent socio-cultural inequalities that fuel displays of 
social unrest in the present, so too must we struggle to promote a message that 
medieval peoples are not wholly alien, irrational, or Other – although different and 
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often confrontational – and cannot be unscrupulously bent to twenty-first-century 
ends. 
We live in a time in which unprecedented globalization, cultural change, and 
fluidity of ideas have created much anxiety and uncertainty about the present and the 
future. In the face of new fears, it is common to shape discourse by reaching into the 
past for sense-making tropes and idioms. It is within this context that culturally 
specific and complex moral panics take place. These panics require fuel, and the 
queerly atemporal imagined Middle Ages has repeatedly been added to the fire.1 The 
results are often erratic and internally inconsistent: as Tison Pugh and Angela Jane 
Weisl have argued, “medievalism in political discourse fluctuates in its effects, and 
contemporary medievalisms in politics exemplify these disjointed strategies.”2 A 
particularly complex and politically germane manifestation occurs when a 
phenomenon that I will term “moral-panic medievalism” appears. 
In his seminal monograph Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Stanley Cohen 
defines the moral panic as “a condition, episode, person or group of persons [who] 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.”3 The notion of the folk 
devil is rooted in the interpretation of the pre-modern, drawing inspiration from the 
imagery of Puritan witch hunts, the actions of the Spanish Inquisition, and incidents of 
popular fear of dualist heresies such as Catharism and Bogomilism. In Cohen’s 
                                               
1 For a thorough treatment of the queerness of medieval time, see Carolyn Dinshaw, How Soon Is 
Now?: Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the Queerness of Time (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2012). 
2 Tison Pugh and Anna Jane Weisl, “Political Medievalisms: The Darkness of the Dark Ages,” in 
Medievalisms: Making the Past in the Present (New York: Routledge, 2013), 140–157 (146). See 144–
146 for an illustrative discussion of Sarah Palin’s 2008 use of the term “blood libel,” its backfire, and 
the ensuing discourse. 
3 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and the Rockers (London: 
Routledge, 1987, 3rd edn), 9. 
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formulation, fear in the present must always be influenced by “folk devils of the past, 
to whom current horrors can be compared.”4 
When the putative stability of the body politic is threatened, an immune 
reaction seeks out the imagined origin of disruption. The phenomenon of moral panic 
is as diverse as the cultural contexts in which it is expressed, and is framed by the 
mores of those involved.5 The intriguing reality of this process is that the historical 
accuracy of comparison becomes distorted, troubling medievalists with popular 
perceptions that are not amenable to traditional scholarly arguments. 
 
The Formation of Moral Panic 
 
Sometimes the object of the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in 
folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and 
long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in 
legal and social policy or even in the way the society itself conceives 
itself.6 – Stanley Cohen 
 
Before progressing further, a description of moral panic is in order. Erich Goode has 
argued that a moral panic is not a “theory,” but a sociological phenomenon. The most 
crucial aspect in the study of it, according to Goode, is the extent to which such 
phenomena can be understood to have real-world referents, and the extent to which 
                                               
4 A great deal of Cohen’s folk-devil thesis is based on Kai T. Erikson’s book Wayward Puritans: A 
Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), a study of deviance through 
the seventeenth-century Puritan Settlement of Massachusetts. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 3. 
5 It is also a concept with a rich history that I have attempted to give justice to in this essay. For a 
survey, see Chas Critcher, “Moral Panic Analysis: Past, Present and Future,” Sociology Compass 2/4 
(2008): 1127–44. 
6 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 1. 
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these referents manifest “interesting and revealing patterns in social life.”7 They 
follow a distinct series of phases, a chain reaction from threat to discourse. Moral 
panic is contagious, potent, and an expression of a fundamental human societal drive. 
To my mind, it represents a societal immune response to putative or actual threat or 
contamination. Just like the human immune system, this process is often subverted, 
and lacks discrimination. When two of what Critcher describes as the “five Ps” – 
Politicians, Pressure groups, Police, Press, and Public – unite behind a moral panic, it 
gains momentum.8 
The power, and the danger, of moral panic stem from its collective 
vehemence, and its pre-hermeneutic motivations. Once the members of Critcher’s five 
Ps have shaped rhetoric against moral danger, the process unfolds in stages. Erich 
Goodman and Nachman Ben-Yehuda have defined the stages of the phenomenon as: 
 
Concern that there will be a negative effect on society; 
Hostility toward “folk devils,” a new Other; 
Consensus that the group in question poses a very real threat to society; 
Disproportionality – the action taken is disproportionate to the actual threat 
posed by the accused group; and 
Volatility – moral panics are highly volatile and tend to disappear as quickly 
as they appeared due to a wane in public interest or news reports changing to 
another topic.9 
 
                                               
7 Erich Goode, “No Need to Panic?: A Bumper Crop of Books on Moral Panics,” Sociological Forum, 
15/3 (2000), 543–52 (551). 
8 Critcher, “Introduction: More Questions than Answers,” in Critical Readings: Moral Panics and the 
Media, ed. Chas Critcher (Maidenhead: Open University Press [2006] 2010), 10–11. 
9 Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 37–41. 
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When taken together, these aspects of moral panic can create an intense outburst of 
media coverage coupled with a governmental and public debate about the nature of 
the perceived disruption and its putative solutions. The emergence of social media has 
vastly intensified the white heat of such explosions.10 
The study of medievalisms of moral panic is doubly germane, for it taps not 
only into the real-world expression of fear, but the historical vocabulary upon which it 
is based. Moral panic is a concept or abstraction that allows us “to trace similarities 
between otherwise apparently very different phenomena,” as Critcher has put it.11 It is 
a phenomenon dependent entirely on socio-cultural context, and thus its expression 
reveals much about the culture that created it. 
Cohen spoke of differential reactions, the many forms that moral panic and the 
reaction to moral panic took. Based on a variety of demographic factors, there are 
many panics and many responses.12 Medievalists have their own differential reaction. 
To risk simplification, this reaction is “how dare they do this to the Middle Ages?” By 
engaging in this reaction, medievalists become part of the process. It would be 
erroneous to claim that the scholarly response is itself a moral panic: Critcher 
proposes that “the moral panic classification does not imply rational appraisal, 
considered reaction or appropriate remedies,”13 It is clear, however, that the act of 
engaging with a moral panic on scholarly terms shifts the debate toward a form of 
argumentation that may seem frustrating and circular. By attempting to remedy flaws 
in the characterization of the past, medievalists often seem to be speaking in a 
language that falls upon deaf ears. In pursuing this process, there is a risk of 
                                               
10 But also, one might say, shortened their duration and increased the rapidity of the public’s “moral 
panic fatigue” along with the increased speed of media dissemination. 
11 Critcher, “Introduction,” in Critical Readings: Moral Panics and the Media, 2. 
12 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 49–56. 
13 Critcher, Critical Readings: Moral Panics and the Media, 3. 
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intellectual rigidity and dogmatism. As M. J. Toswell warns us, pursuing authenticity 
(or historicity) with zeal is a risky endeavor: 
 
Under the guise of being historically accurate, deeply conservative ideas about 
human behavior can justify themselves as a pretence, a recreation of earlier 
times. In other words, recreating a “true medieval” experience [.. .] is a highly 
dubious ethical endeavor.14 
 
Pugh and Weisl describe the new medieval-esque creation of a “true” medieval’ as 
something that defeats our analysis: any recourse to the “real” past will fail to explain 
it.15 If medievalism is “the continuing process of creating the Middle Ages,” as Leslie 
Workman describes it, then the influence of the Middle Ages on moral-panic 
phenomena is itself the influence of modernity upon our perception of the medieval.16 
When these tendencies feed into already volatile popular phenomena, the results can 
be incendiary. 
The life blood of moral panics are powerful and pervasive tropes and idioms, 
many of them medievalisms. Tropes, as Toswell has described them, “offer ways in 
which someone engaged in recreating the Middle Ages can do so with a kind of useful 
shorthand, or can engage in extensive and deliberate research so as to reach for 
                                               
14 M. J. Toswell, “The Dangers of the Search for Authenticity?: The Ethics of Hallowe’en,” in Studies 
in Medievalism XXIII: Ethics and Medievalism, ed. Karl Fugelso (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2014), 1–
10 (9). 
15 Argued in the context of the Iraq war. To cite further, “within the wider cultural imaginary, this sense 
of the medieval, although very much a reduction of a complex history, takes a baggy historical period 
loosely defined by geography and with as many diversions as similarities, and turns it into a single 
entity, a signifier of irrational, violent darkness.” Pugh and Weisl, “Political Medievalisms,” 147. 
16 Leslie J. Workman, Preface to Studies in Medievalism VIII: Medievalism in Europe II, ed. Leslie J. 
Workman and Kathleen Verduin (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1996), 1–2. 
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authenticity.”17 They are the building blocks of medievalisms, and the tropes 
discussed below are so pervasive within popular imagination that they have passed 
from the realm of history into generic standard.18 Cohen’s notion of the folk devil 
folds all of pre-modernity into a mixed “medieval” past that bears little resemblance 
to the world that medievalists study. By reducing history into emotive tropes lacking a 
concrete medieval or early modern foundation, they eschew notions of accuracy or 
inaccuracy, and yet still remain powerful. They should collapse under the weight of 
their inherent ridiculousness – to paraphrase Pugh and Weisl discussing the nostalgic 
“magic” of the Middle Ages – and yet they endure.19 
In the field of studies in medievalism, we have witnessed an unprecedented 
variety of social anxieties exorcized through the lens of pre-modernity – its putative 
qualities and relationship to modernity serving as grist for the mill. When developing 
the initial research for this paper in 2013, there was no way that I could have 
anticipated the events leaving a swathe of violence across 2014 and 2015. The Islamic 
State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS, ISIL, IS, or Daesh) emerged, proclaiming a caliphate 
and provoking a firestorm of reactions and counter-reactions in which the word 
“medieval” played a key role.20 Claims by the organization to a historically legitimate 
caliphate were met with accusations of brutal atavistic behavior reminiscent of 
“medieval” savagery. 
Claims of “medieval” savagery have been counteracted by medievalists with 
the argument that medieval Islam was enlightened and cosmopolitan, and that the 
                                               
17 M. J. Toswell, “The Tropes of Medievalism,” in Defining Medievalism(s): Studies in Medievalism 
XVII: Defining Medievalism(s), ed. Karl Fugelso (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2009), 68–76 (70). 
18 Many of these tropes serve as critical terms, as demonstrated by the new volume edited by Elizabeth 
Emory and Richard Utz entitled Medievalism: Key Critical Terms (Rochester, NY: Boydell and 
Brewer, 2014). 
19 Pugh and Weisl, “Medievalisms: The Magic of the Middle Ages,” in Medievalisms, 1–11 (1). 
20 This article recognizes that the title of the organization used in the media is contested, and that this is 
in itself a struggle within the moral panic discourse surrounding it. 
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Islamic State are thoroughly modern terrorists. As Clare Monagle and Louise 
D’Arcens have argued in a September 2014 article for The Conversation, “when 
politicians, commentators and indeed terrorists try to get political mileage from using 
the term ‘medieval’ they should understand that this idea does not align with historical 
fact. Instead, it is an idea that bears and perpetuates an ideology of othering.”21 This 
terminology describes the process of a moral panic within political and media 
discourse, the distortion of the past to remedy moral confusion in the present. On The 
Public Medievalist blog, Amy S. Kaufman adds to this debate by highlighting the 
medievalisms shaped by “Islamic State” themselves, whose “dark dream of 
medievalism, constructed half by history and half by desire, thrives in our collective 
imagination and threatens to cast a long shadow over our future.”22 
The cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo magazine were gunned down in Paris by 
Islamic extremists while exercising an anticlerical attitude, and key pundits suggested 
that Islam was in need of a “reformation” or an “enlightenment,”23 implying that the 
Muslim world exists in a time before modernity, before the cultural changes that made 
the West “better.”24 The attack on free speech attached itself to images of a time 
before reason when books were burned, the heterodox were censured or killed, and 
religion was unassailable. Public figures stoked the fires – a prominent example being 
                                               
21 Clare Monagle and Louise D’Arcens, “‘Medieval’ makes a comeback in modern politics: what’s 
going on?” The Conversation, 22 September 2014, <http://theconversation.com/medieval-makes-a-
comeback-in-modern-politics-whats-going-on-31780>, accessed 22 June 2015. 
22 Amy S. Kaufman, “Dark Revivals: Medievalism and ISIS,” The Public Medievalist, 16 October 
2014, <http://www.publicmedievalist.com/dark-revivals-medievalism-isis>, accessed 15 June 2015. 
23 For an early form of this oft-repeated argument in the British press, see Allan Massey, “When will 
we see an Islamic Enlightenment?” The Telegraph, 21 March 2012, 
<http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/allanmassie/100061815/when-will-we-see-an-islamic-
enlightenment/>, accessed 15 June 2015. For a powerful refutation in the wake of Charlie Hebdo, see 
Christopher de Bellaigue, “Stop Calling for a Muslim Enlightenment,” The Guardian, 19 February 
2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/19/stop-calling-for-a-muslim-enlightenment>, 
accessed 12 June 2015. 
24 The Guardian’s Giles Fraser aptly describes this idea as a “secular salvation myth.” See “Our secular 
salvation myth distances us from reality,” The Guardian, 21 November 2014, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2014/nov/21/secular-salvation-myth-distances-us-
from-reality>, accessed 24 February 2015. 
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Salman Rushdie, who claimed that “Religion, a mediaeval form of unreason, when 
combined with modern weaponry becomes a real threat to our freedoms,” and that 
Islamic State was a “deadly mutation” at the heart of Islam.25 This phenomenon has 
greatly worried not only the Muslim community, but also the medievalists who find 
their area of expertise bent to new and unpalatable ends. 
Through intense debates that fill our public consciousness, we can ascertain a 
strong and continuous theme: order is threatened, an explanation is required, and 
medievalism is a key ingredient at work. The initial impulse resembles what 
anthropologist Johannes Fabian has termed the “denial of coevalness,” a discursive 
strategy for placing an object of study in a realm outside of the epoch, sequence of 
events, and intellectual framework of the present26: 
 
Sooner or later, thinking about memory gets us to consider identity, individual 
as well as collective, psychological as well as cultural. Not only that, if it is 
true that recognizing others also means remembering them then we should see 
relations between Self and other as a struggle for recognition, interpersonal as 
well as political.27 
 
As Fabian argues, denial of coevalness is a denial of legitimacy, and the process of 
thinking through the problem allows for remediation to take place. Failure to do so 
allows unscrupulous members of the five Ps to use the past to frame fear in the 
present. This was the case in 2011, when latent imaginings of mob unreason 
                                               
25 Reported by English Pen on 7 January 2015, <http://www.englishpen.org/campaigns/salman-
rushdie-condemns-attack-on-charlie-hebdo/>, accessed 15 June 2015. 
26 Introduced in Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New 
York: Columbia University Press, [1983] 2014). 
27 Fabian, Time and the Other, 177. 
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combined with current affairs to shift a popular discourse and medievalize an already 
potent moral panic. 
 
 
The 2011 London Riots: The “Medieval” Mentality of the Crowd 
 
When studied in historical context, popular unrest has a human face. When 
sensationalized and converted into a form of popular entertainment, it is a ghoulish 
spectacle. Take, for example, the 1381 London Peasants’ revolt. When studied within 
the framework of historical analysis, the revolt is a story of post-plague labor 
shortage, taxation grievance, the popular demagoguery of Wat Tyler and John Balle, 
and the disquiet of a ruling elite caught in a complex social change. It was not a 
mindless orgy of violence, but the expression of a radical political agenda that 
anticipated the French Revolution by four centuries, and would have fundamentally 
changed the country had it succeeded.28 The result is a dramatic series of violent acts 
culminating in an ambiguous compromise for peasantry and nobility alike. The same 
could be said of other incidents of popular unrest from within the medieval peasantry: 
dramatic, but rooted in political grievance and social unrest. 
However, the story transforms into a tale laden with moral panic undertones 
when the drama of the events of 1381 enter the realms of popular history. Take for 
example this extract from Dan Jones’ tellingly-entitled Summer of Blood: 
 
“A revell, A revell!” 
                                               
28 Juliet Barker, 1381: The Year of the Peasants’ Revolt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014), ix. 
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No one could forget the noise when Wat Tyler led his ragtag army of roofers 
and farmers, bakers, millers, ale-tasters and parish priests into the City of 
London on a crusade of bloodthirsty justice. [.. .] It was as if, thought one 
observer, all the devils in hell had found some dark portal and flooded into the 
City.29 
 
This description, lurid and yet still historicist, represents the gateway through which 
history becomes trope and social grievance becomes moral disruption and deviance. A 
distortion occurs when history of the revolt relies on the accounts of its contemporary 
chroniclers, all clergymen and nearly all monastics with little or no sympathy for or 
understanding of the rebels. Their views were a contemporary moral panic based on 
fear of a book-burning, bestial, and illiterate mob and anger at a perceived breach of 
divine order, and yet they are often read as transparent fact.30 They have provided fuel 
for sensational historical writing, which in turn provides the core tropes and idioms 
for modern panics. Within the metamorphosis of academic history into popular and 
purple prose, the events of 1381 found themselves bonded to another very different 
series of events taking place within the City of London centuries later. The political 
value of their conflation was not lost on shrewd media pundits. 
The Daily Mail published a 30 September 2011 article entitled “The London 
Riots 1381: The blood-soaked uprising which changed the face of England forever.”31 
While one could take this article at face value – a discussion of the 1381 Peasant’s 
Revolt as revealed by the accomplished photo tableaux artist Red Saunders – the 
                                               
29 Dan Jones, Summer of Blood: The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 (London: Harper Collins, 2010), 1. 
30 Barker, 1381, x. 
31 John Gillingham, “The London Riots 1381: The blood-soaked uprising which changed the face of 
England forever,” The Daily Mail (Mail Online), 30 September 2011, 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2043576/London-Riots-1381-Blood-soaked-Peasants-
Revolt-changed-England-forever.html>, accessed 30 July 2015. 
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article appears to fit into an altogether more cynical thread of representation by the 
newspaper. The mob that threatened King Richard II of England in the fourteenth 
century is revealed in “realistic” detail by Saunders and narrated engagingly by John 
Gillingham.32 By publishing an article on this topic so close to the London riots, the 
right-wing Daily Mail links the brutal and blood-soaked mob of the photo tableaux to 
the crude and apolitical mob of popular imagination. A superstitious “medieval” 
mentality emerges in media analysis, and the tabloid papers fold 1381 into 2011. 
The timing of the piece was powerful: the sixth and the eighth of August 2011 
saw London rocked by an outbreak of civil unrest that spread through its boroughs, 
and through towns across England. The initial stimulus was the shooting of 29-year-
old black man Mark Duggan in Tottenham by the Metropolitan Police. Following a 
protest by Duggan’s friends and family and fueled by racial tension and poverty, 
subsequent copycat events spiraled far beyond the initial stimulus, moving from a 
civil-rights protest to a riot in a short amount of time. For many, the looting and 
damage to property was inexplicable and fear-inducing, a sign of “broken Britain.”33 
In the heat of a full-blown moral panic, elements of Critcher’s five Ps defined a 
discourse based on the vilification of a folk devil, the criminal and feckless 
underclass. Rather than raise difficult and pressing questions about police treatment of 
black Britons, public perceptions took a rapid and medievalism-laden turn. The 
process follows many of the clarifications on the process of moral theory outlined by 
Yvonne Jewkes in her 2004 criminological analysis of moral panics: 
 
                                               
32 Although, as Kenneth Thompson has argued, it is problematic to read cynical and manipulative 
motives into media reports of moral-panic phenomena – the reporter may very well believe what they 
write. See Moral Panics: Key Ideas (London: Routledge, 1998), 9. 
33 A term originally coined and propagated in approximately 2007 by British tabloid The Sun and 
repeated up by the British Conservative Party. The left-wing paper The Guardian has frequently 
attempted to counter this narrative. 
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 Moral panics occur when the media turn a reasonably ordinary event and 
present it as extraordinary; 
 The media, in particular, set in motion a deviance amplification spiral, through 
which the subjects of the panic are viewed as a source of moral decline and 
social disintegration; 
 Moral panics clarify the moral boundaries of the society in which they occur; 
 Moral panics occur during periods of rapid social change and anxiety; and 
 Young people are the usual target of moral panics, their behavior is “regarded 
as a barometer to test the health or sickness of as society.”34 
 
In the climate of a Britain shaped by Tony Blair and New Labour’s 90s message of 
middle-class aspiration, the vilification of the disadvantaged found fertile ground.35 
The deviance amplification spiral of discourse was rapid, painting the young and 
disenfranchised acting in a comprehensible and yet disruptive manner as a symptom 
of social malaise. Police, politicians, press, and public united around a shared vision 
of what Chloe Peacock has described as “a ‘sick’ (or, in then-Justice Secretary Ken 
Clarke’s words, ‘feral’) underclass characterized by greed, irresponsibility, 
worklessness, laziness, welfare dependence and poor parenting.”36 By reshaping the 
working class from “salt of the earth” into “scum of the earth,” the popular 
imagination placed the behavior of the rioters outside of the realm of political action, 
                                               
34 Yvonne Jewkes, Media and Crime. Key Approaches to Criminology (London: Sage, 2004), 67. 
35 This process is narrated in columnist and activist Owen Jones’ 2012 book Chavs: The Demonization 
of the Working Class (London: Verso Books, 2nd edn, esp. 110–39.) 
36 Chloe Peacock, “Remembering the Riots: Citizenship and ‘Social Cleansing’ After the London Riots 
of 2011,” Unpublished Dissertation, University of Sussex, 4. The dissertation is published online at 
<https://d19ylpo4aovc7m.cloudfront.net/fileadmin/howard_league/user/pdf/Publications/Remembering
_the_riots_web.pdf>, accessed 3 June 2015, having won the 2014 Sunley Prize awarded by the Howard 
League for Penal Reform. Peacock’s dissertation follows the media reaction to the riots in detail. 
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outside the normal, legitimate, or comprehensible.37 It painted a picture of degeneracy 
and behavioral atavism in need of extreme remedies. It pushed the discussion into a 
space in which we come face to face with medievalism: the brutal realm of the 
“medieval” mob. The notion of the “medieval” mob – from pitchfork-wielding 
villagers in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to its comedic portrayal as a trope of mob 
rule in The Simpsons – offers a shorthand for understanding a potentially traumatic 
disruption of a self-imagined orderly society.38 This stereotyping of mobs as 
something anterior to and outside of modernity has a history that is rooted in the 
understanding of medieval people.39 
In the shaping of popular imagination of mob violence, a popular believe 
prevails. There is something atavistic, something dehumanizing, about membership of 
a crowd or mob. We lose our reason, and descend into something that predates the 
individual, predates the notion of the enlightened political actors that those in liberal 
democracies believe themselves to be. Television and Hollywood propagate this 
belief: any post-apocalyptic landscape is filled with the sound of man becoming the 
wolf of man, as the classical adage goes. Much of this is owed to the nineteenth-
century text The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, a study of the phenomenon by 
the French sociologist Gustave le Bon. The book argues that “[b]y the very fact that 
he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs on the ladder of 
civilisation”, that “[i]solated, he may be a cultivated individual; [but] in a crowd, he is 
a barbarian – that is, a creature acting by instinct.”40 
                                               
37 An apt phrase from Jones, Chavs, blurb and passim. 
38 The mob appears in The Simpsons Movie (2007), but is a recurring trope in the show. 
39 The depiction became even more potent when combined with an existing moral panic about 
“Hoodies,” feckless and violent youths acting out against society as a symptom of a wider social 
malaise. For a discussion of the “Hoodie” moral panic, see Ian Marsh and Gaynor Melville, “Moral 
Panics and the British Media – A Look at some contemporary ‘Folk Devils’,” Internet Journal of 
Criminology (2011), 1–21. 
40 Gustave le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (New York: Macmillan, 1896), 13. 
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Gustave le Bon took his inspiration in this analysis from the French 
Revolution, a phenomenon fueled by the Enlightenment and yet the incubator of 
explosive mob violence. We see the seed of the “medieval” mob trope in the same 
work, for le Bon characterizes the era that came before the Age of Revolutions as a 
space of un-reflexive moral panic: 
 
The Middle Ages and the Renaissance possessed many enlightened men, but 
not a single man who attained by reasoning an appreciation of the childish side 
of his superstitions, or who promulgated even a slight doubt as to the misdeeds 
of the devil or the necessity of burning sorcerers.41 
 
Although the popular imagination of moral panic and of the Middle Ages has moved 
on, this notion has endured. Gustave le Bon and others of his milieu proposed many 
ideas that are popularly rejected in the twenty-first century – male supremacism, racial 
profiling, discredited science – and yet the theory of the crowd that he and his 
contemporaries developed endures. Like the spector of Washington Irving’s 
Christopher Columbus and his flat world, the trope of a crowd caught in a time before 
reason continues to haunt popular discourse. The typecasting of the medieval mind as 
superstitious and lacking in reason makes the mob fit comfortable in a time before 
Voltaire or Rousseau, making the incongruity of modern mob violence make sense. It 
is not a breach in modern society, but simply an anachronism. When human minds 
participate in a mob, they abandon modernity. They return to the age before reason, 
the Dark Ages of popular imagination. Free from guilt, the putative “medieval” mob 
mentality exists in an age before self-reflexivity and critical thought. Consequently, 
                                               
41 le Bon, The Crowd, 115. 
16 
 
the trope follows, we must ask ourselves why this unwholesome medievalism 
continues to plague us. 
By converting the discourse on the riots into a medievalism, the other 
complexities of the event are merged into an adversarial narrative in which the 
reasonable and sophisticated population are horrified and repelled by the brutal mob 
mentality of a group determined to eschew societal norms. Thus, when London Mayor 
Boris Johnson recently expressed his opinion on the future response to rioters, we 
hear echoes of 1381 when he advocated that “[y]ou get medieval immediately on 
these people and you come down much harder, and you don’t allow a mentality to 
arise of sheer wanton criminality.”42 
When Johnson – a member of the English social elite – opined that the 
government should “get medieval” on those who had threatened his vision of an 
orderly society, he slipped into the role of feudal overlord punishing his social 
inferiors. Instead of military backlash, Johnson proposed water cannons and 
expensive riot gear. By characterizing the motivation of the riots as “sheer wanton 
criminality,” the ruling elite demonstrate the use of medievalism to provide a clear foe 
and coherent solution in response to moral panic. The subsequent actions of Critcher’s 
five Ps followed a similar pattern. The politicians spread a narrative of social 
degeneracy, and proposed a harsher response in future; the police were authorized (or 
encouraged) to decisively and aggressively quell future riots; the press entered into a 
narrative of vilification and highlighted the selfless cohesion of the “good” Britons 
who helped to clean up after the riots; and the public were polarized by fear of social 
                                               
42 David Barrett, “‘Get medieval’ on rioters, says Boris Johnson,” The Telegraph, 29 January 2014, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10604843/Get-medieval-on-rioters-says-Boris-
Johnson.html>, accessed 23 July 2015. 
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disorder and the desire to see future outbreaks curtails.43 The attention of the moral 
panic was firmly fixed on Johnson’s wanton criminals, and the methods by which 
their “problem” could be “solved.” 
 It is significant and important to note that seemingly similar stimulus events 
can often have vastly different results. Moral panics require a unique combination of 
factors in order to grow, and many factors can influence their outcome. A panic can 
fizzle if there is no clearly identified and commonly agreed folk devil figure or group, 
if there is no clear reactive course of action to be taken, or if the public does not 
engage with the message created by media, interest groups, police, or government. 
Twenty-first-century social-media spaces allow powerful counter-narratives to 
emerge, challenging hegemonic messages, and rapidly transforming moral-panic 
discourses. An example of the heterogeneity of scenarios appears in the case of the 
2014 riots in Ferguson, Missouri. Rather than transforming into a process of social 
vilification, the unique socio-cultural environment of a seemingly similar scenario led 
to a different public debate.44 The message that many took from the events 
surrounding Michael Brown’s death was not fear of mob violence, but that of 
collective self-reflection on the relationship between African Americans and law 
enforcement officers. The famous twitter hashtag of #BlackLivesMatter could easily 
have been applied to the events of 2011 in London, and yet a moral panic took a 
different turn entirely.45 
                                               
43 For further details, see Peacock, “Remembering the Riots.” 
44 Compare this discourse to that of the 1981 Brixton riots, in which the public debate and subsequent 
Scarman Report focused on the social inequality and poverty of the Afro-Caribbean community, who 
were subsequently found to be disproportionately affected by the recession of the early 1980s and by 
inner-city decline. 
45 A sign of how marked the difference in discourse became in the case of Ferguson can be seen in 
Darlena Cunha’s article for TIME magazine, which argued that “Riots are a necessary part of the 
evolution of society” (“Ferguson: In Defense of Rioting,” 25 November 2014, 
<http://time.com/3605606/ferguson-in-defense-of-rioting/>, accessed 13 June 2015. 
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 By linking a “history-ish” understanding of the relationship between mob 
behavior and social development, the medievalizing of moral panics allows the 
discourse to eject the object of distrust from modernity, to place it back in the past. As 
Fabian has argued, denying coevality to imagined folk devils strips them of the 
legitimacy of articulate modern voices. Popular discontent – often as extreme as civil 
unrest – over poverty, inequality, or injustice is a threat to the established order when 
framed within the cultural context of the present. The disconcerting revelations about 
racial inequality and police brutality revealed by the 2011 death of Mark Duggan were 
obscured when the media and government message shifted to a vision of the atavistic 
mob mentality of those trapped outside of mainstream ideologies, a group no different 
to their fourteenth-century “antecedents.” When caught up in such a debate, the use 
and abuse of tropes cherry picked from our understanding of the past convert 
medievalisms into patches placed on ragged holes in a Western society’s positive 
image of itself. The case-study example of the “medieval” mob mentality is but one of 
a vast array of related tropes. Think of the headlines of papers: “witch hunt,” 
“medieval torture,” “superstition,” and so on. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The effects of moral-panic medievalism go beyond the media and permeate the very 
foundations of popular culture. In 2013, for example, an extremely critical review of 
Ben Affleck’s film Argo revealed that an image of a mob on our screens can never be 
apolitical. Set during the turmoil of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the film narrates a 
plot to extract a group of US embassy staff from Tehran using the cover of a film 
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crew in the country to create the eponymous and fictitious science-fiction film. In the 
film, there are repeated images of revolutionary Iranian mobs, vast crowds of angry 
people reduced to a rapacious and inhuman swarm by the film’s narrative. Critic 
Kevin Lee pointed out the disturbing effects of this portrayal: 
 
Instead of keeping its eye on the big picture of revolutionary Iran, the film 
settles into a retrograde “white Americans in peril” storyline. It recasts those 
oppressed Iranians as a raging, zombie-like horde, the same dark-faced 
demons from countless other movies – still a surefire dramatic device for 
instilling fear in an American audience.46 
 
The film’s depiction of the mob besieging the US embassy in Tehran is disturbingly 
similar to a George Romero zombie film. A mindless mob united only by their hatred 
of America paw at the fences, seeking to form a breach through which they can enter 
the compound and sate their collective rage. This image, produced almost 
subconsciously, demonstrates the disturbing conflation of mob violence with social 
insecurity and cultural distrust. 
 By eschewing politics in favor of racially-charged monster-film tropes, the 
film demonstrates the deep-seated fear of mobs within the popular imagination. They 
exist at the margins of ordered thought and reasoned society, destroying local, 
national, or international order. These fears move beyond shaping audience reactions 
to films, feeding into large-scale reactions to public disorder. Within this context, it is 
unnerving to observe real-life monsters being created out of the massed bodies of 
                                               
46 Kevin B. Lee, “Argo, F--k Yourself: This Year’s Worst Best Picture Nominee,” Slate, 25 February 
2013, 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2013/01/down_with_argo_ben_affleck_s_iran_hostage_
movie_is_the_worst.html>, 23 June 2015. 
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rioters. Ejected from the present and sanctioned from reason, these figures attract 
tropes, grow in putative and disproportionate threat, and emerge as a fully mature folk 
devil born from historical, socio-cultural, and xenophobic anxieties. 
The reaction of medievalists to moral-panic medievalism can be extremely 
problematic, and solutions can be tortuous. Experts, disturbed by the abuse of their 
knowledge, lash out at misconceptions. This reaction, although spirited and erudite, 
can have little effect on public discourse. Understanding the moral-panic phenomenon 
explains why. The very comparison of pre-modernity to a Bad Thing (violence, 
dogmatism, superstition, intolerance) is often invalid. The medievalism has been born 
regardless of accuracy, and the public will run with it when the circumstances are 
right. Just like a fire, a moral panic needs fuel to grow and the right climate to spread. 
Medievalists are not fire fighters, but we can offer the tools for a different discourse. 
Work such as that of Louise D’Arcens and Clare Monagle demonstrate the power of a 
new reframing of narrative. By denying the frame of reference (unfamiliar = 
medieval; medieval = atavistic) that grafts medievalism to moral panic, we can play a 
role in the public discourse. 
Moral panics deploying medievalisms are virulent and repetitive. They are 
impossible to refute, because they are not amenable to expert counter-argument. That 
is to say, a medievalist intervening and saying that “the Middle Ages was not like 
that” only strengthens the link by giving it credence. Fear thrives, and the fearful 
place a medieval face on their fears. We fear the public and the media 
misappropriating our subject matter and abusing it, and so we create a new Other. As 
Julia Kristeva put it, “To each ego its object, to each superego its abject.”47 The 
ethical dimension of the mind forms an image of something unethical, the arbitration 
                                               
47 Julia Kristeva, “Approaching Abjection,” in Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), 1–31 (2). 
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of good moral behavior creates an immoral counterexample. The cycle of moral panic 
is caught up in the cycle of abjection. Only by engaging in a process of meta-
cognitive analysis can we apprehend the cycle. As the Peasants’ revolt example 
demonstrates, concepts that flourish unchallenged in the present will shape the future 
of fear, often for centuries to come. 
 
 
